In The Sufi Doctrine of Man , Richard Todd examines the life and thought of Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī , Ibn 'Arabī's chief disciple and a key figure in the development of Sufi metaphysics.

The examination of the works and views of Muḥy al-Dīn al-’Arabī’s spiritual heir Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, due to the notorious terseness of his style, is an extremely difficult task. In addition, al-Qūnawī expected the reader to be acquainted with the entire corpus of his works, since many important ideas are mentioned in only one of them, without ever being repeated elsewhere in his writings. In many cases, he limits himself to a brief allusion or hint, without discussing the point at (...) issue in detail. Furthermore, not infrequently he warns the reader that, for certain reasons, one or more important aspects of the issue are not mentioned at all, since they must be kept secret. In his last will, he instructed his.. (shrink)

The human being is a multi-faceted entity, and within the spiritual realm, two primary centers govern: the center of reason (ʿaql) and the center of love (ʿishq). Human beings possess the faculty of thought, which, through reason, discerns truth from falsehood in the domain of theoretical and epistemic inquiry and fulfills practical functions in the domain of action. Love, however, arises from the human inclination toward ultimate perfection. According to ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, love constitutes an existential connection between the lover and (...) the beloved, manifesting as an attraction between the perfect cause (ʿillat kāmilah) and the perfected effect (maʿlūl mustakmil). Through ḥarakat al-jawhariyyah (substantial motion), humans ascend from the level of potential intellect (ʿaql hayūlānī) to the level of acquired intellect (ʿaql mustafād), thereby attaining the boundless joy of Divine knowledge. Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī identifies two aspects of reason: first, as a faculty of logical reasoning and deduction, and second, as an instrument for apprehending intuitive truths (ḥaqāʾiq shuhūdiyyah). While the former is prone to error in logical structures or deductive reasoning, the latter is neither constrained by limitation nor subject to error. Qūnawī considers the human essence to be the qalb (heart), characterized by its intermediary (barzakhiyyah) and unitive (aḥadiyyah jamʿiyyah) nature, which allows it to apprehend all truths-universal and particular alike. The highest attainment of the intellect is ʿaql mustafād (acquired intellect). Yet, through the heart’s love, the human being transcends the realm of intellect and enters the Divine Presence (ṣuqʿ rabbūbī). When the heart receives truths from higher realms, it transforms ordinary intellect into sacred intellect (ʿaql qudsī). This sacred intellect, being an illuminated intellect (ʿaql munawwar), not only comprehends divine truths but also retains the ability to engage in logical and philosophical reasoning. ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī identifies three paths to the knowledge of God: sensory perception (ḥiss), rational intellect (ʿaql), and the innate or heartfelt path (ṭarīq qalbī wa-fiṭrī). The innate path corresponds to the human heart’s natural inclination toward the Ultimate Source (mabdaʾ al-mabādī). For ʿAllāmah, sharīʿah (divine law), grounded in illuminated and sacred intellect as well as divine revelation, aligns with human nature (fiṭrah) and facilitates human happiness through the harmonious integration of reason, love, and divine guidance. In Qūnawī’s thought, divine love (ʿishq ilāhī) refers to the primordial divine longing resulting from the unity of the divine names (asmāʾ). This love signifies a metaphysical movement and inclination inherent to the divine names themselves, independent of external causation. Qūnawī devoted significant effort to providing a rational framework for unveiling (kashf) and mystical intuition (shuhūd), asserting that the limitations of reason in comparison to intuition do not signify its absolute inefficacy. He critiques reason confined to Aristotelian rationality (ʿaql mashāʾī), emphasizing its dependence on theoretical reasoning, its susceptibility to imagination (wahm), and its limitations when devoid of intuitive insight. Consequently, before reason is elevated to sacred intellect through the heart, it may find itself in conflict with certain stages of love. (shrink)

This study deals with the sceptical arguments by one of the most important figures in the philosophical Sufi tradition (the Akbarian school) and the foremost disciple of Ibn ʿArabī, Ṣadr al‐Dīn al‐Qūnawī. Though not a sceptic in the strict sense, Qūnawī employs sceptical arguments from relativity of rational knowledge and disagreement among philosophers to prove inefficacy of reason and rational procedures of knowledge in terms of achieving certain knowledge of metaphysical matters, namely of God and the ultimate principles of things. (...) The paper questions Qūnawī's implicit assumption that, if there is disagreement on a proposition p, then p is relative and thus cannot provide certain knowledge. It aims to philosophically analyse and assess his scepticism as well as to shed light on the largely unknown terrain of scepticism in the mediaeval Islamic world. (shrink)

Quʹest-ce que lʹêre? Cette question passe pour fonder la philosophie. Encore faut-il s'entendre sur le sens du mot "être ". L'essence des choses détermine-t-elle leur existence? Devons-nous affirmer, au contraire, que l'existence conditionne l'intensité d'être qui qualifie une certaine réalité? Molla Sadr Shirazi, dans ce traité écrit en Iran au siècle de Descartes et de Leibniz, médite ces questions qui sont encore les nôtres. Mais les solutions qu'il propose s'évadent hors de nos perspectives, après avoir opéré une révolution décisive dans (...) la métaphysique des Orientaux. Penseur shi'ite en butte à la persécution, Molla Sadra est la plus haute figure de la philosophie iranienne islamique au temps splendide de la cour safavide d'Ispahan. Sa doctrine du primat de l'existence, que le présent ouvrage expose complètement, ouvre sur une interprétation spirituelle de la résurrection des corps. Cette traduction par Henry Corbin, qui fut aussi l'éditeur du texte original, a fait événement : par son ample introduction, il situe la question de l'être et déploie une explication comparée de ce que l'Occident grec puis médiéval en ont fait, avec la tradition shi'iite. -- Back cover. (shrink)

The central issue in this work is self-knowledge. The human soul is created in the Image of God with a purpose.

Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi's life spanned the last two thirds of the seventh/thirteenth centuries. A student of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, he was involved in the revival of Peripatetic philosophy and science that occurred at Maraghah under his influence. He was significant as a transitional figure, combining Suhrawardi's Illuminative philosophy with the revived Avicennism of his teacher. His commentary on Suhrawardi's Philosophy of Illumination was the main vehicle through which this work was studied by later Iranian philosophers. He was also associated with (...) Ibn Arabi's most important student, Sadr al-Din al-Qunawi. ;Suhrawardi's Philosophy of Illumination contained a new "Science of Light", expressed largely in symbols, intended to provide a reformed basis for physics and metaphysics. Qutb al-Din frequently translated these views into Peripatetic terminology so as to make the relationships between the two systems clearer. Qutb al-Din's Pearly Crown is a popular account of philosophy, incorporating and elaborating much of Suhrawardi's philosophy but omitting or disguising the most controversial and esoteric aspects--especially those related to the World of Image, the Afterlife, and reincarnation. ;Qutb al-Din developed further the notion of the "World of Image." This "fourth world" served both philosophical and religious purposes. His ideas on reincarnation and the cyclical nature of time were especially distinctive and were developed beyond the views found in The Philosophy of Illumination. ;Also included in this dissertation are an annotated bibliography of Qutb al-Din's works and their known manuscripts and an edition and translation of his "Epistle Ascertaining the Reality of the World of Image" {Risalah fi Tahqiq )Alam al-Mithal}. (shrink)

Abū al-Ma’ālī Sadr al-Dīn Muhammad b. Ishāq al-Qūnawī nacque probabilmente a Konya nel 605/1209 e morì nel 673/1274. L’influenza che Ibn al-’Arabī esercitò su Qūnawī fu decisiva e lo _shaykh al-akbar_ riservò questa questa particolare formazione esclusivamente a lui, forse proprio perché il compito del suo erede spirituale e interprete era già stato “ previsto”. In questo intervento tracceremo uno dei punti fondamentali del pensiero di Qūnawī, basandoci sulla prima epistola del carteggio che si concentra proprio sulla questione del _rapporto (...) tra conoscenza filosofica e illuminazione divina_, questione che si ritrova nell’opera del nostro sufi e che lo contraddistingue all’interno del pensiero sufi in generale, collocandolo nella scuola ibnarabiana. Abū al-Ma‘ālī Sadr al-Dīn Muhammad b. Ishāq al-Qūnawī was born probably in Konya in 605/1209 and died in 673/1274. The influence that Ibn al-‘Arabī exerted on Qūnawī was decisive and the _shaykh al-akbar_ reserved this intense education and this particular training exclusively for him, perhaps precisely because the task of his spiritual heir and interpreter had already been “foreseen”. In this intervention we will trace one of the fundamental points of Qūnawī’s thought, relying on the first epistle of the correspondence that focuses precisely on the question of the _relationship between philosophical knowledge and divine illumination_, a question that is found throughout the work of our Sufi and that it distinguishes it within Sufi thought in general, placing it within the Ibnarabian school. (shrink)

The study is dedicated to the work of Crimean scholar Ahmad bin ‘Abdallah al-Qrimi, who was one of the most advanced interpreters of the Ibn Arabi’s and Sadr al-Din al-Qunawi’s Sufi philosophy. Ahmad al-Qrimi employed Ibn Sina’s views on division of essence and existence, as well as some concepts of Maturidi kalam. His manuscript work “Advise for the Perplexed and Key for the Exigent” shows main dimensions of Ahmad al-Qrimi’s thought as following: 1) The notion of Being in the works (...) of Ibn Arabi and Sadr al-Din al-Qunawi is interpreted as the idea of necessary existence, as suggested by ibn Sina; 2) the conception of the identity of the absolute and necessary being is understood as the only right approach for the solution of polemics between adepts and critics of Sufism; 3) conception of “correlation” is considered as solution for the problem of relations between mind and reality. (shrink)

Sad al-Din Dashtaki, and following him, Mulla Sadra Shirazi maintains that all real compositions are unified. After a short review of Dashtaki’s thesis, we concentrate on Mulla Sadra’s version. Mulla Sadra believes that Dashtaki’s version is not coherent and he declines the existence of real parts. We will argue that Mulla Sadra’s objections do not work and furthermore, all things said and done there is no difference between these two versions of the thesis of unified composition. If there is any (...) difference, it is about their theory of existence, not about their theory of composition. Sad al-Din Dashtaki, and following him, Mulla Sadra Shirazi maintains that all real compositions are unified. After a short review of Dashtaki’s thesis, we concentrate on Mulla Sadra’s version. Mulla Sadra believes that Dashtaki’s version is not coherent and he declines the existence of real parts. We will argue that Mulla Sadra’s objections do not work and furthermore, all things said and done there is no difference between these two versions of the thesis of unified composition. If there is any difference, it is about their theory of existence, not about their theory of composition. (shrink)

The author gives a clear explanation of the philosophy of Sard al-Din Shirazi.

Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 1240) was one of the towering figures of Islamic intellectual history, and among Sufis still bears the title of al-shaykh al-akbar, or "the greatest master." Ibn al-'Arabī and Islamic Intellectual Culturetraces the history of the concept of "oneness of being" (wahdat al-wujūd) in the school of Ibn al- 'Arabī, in order to explore the relationship between mysticism and philosophy in Islamic intellectual life. It examines how the conceptual language used by early mystical writers became increasingly engaged over (...) time with the broader Islamic intellectual culture, eventually becoming integrated with the latter's common philosophical and theological vocabulary. It focuses on four successive generations of thinkers (Sadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, Mu'ayyad al-Dīn al-Jandī, 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī, and Dāwūd al-Qaysarī), and examines how these "philosopher-mystics" refined and developed the ideas of Ibn al-'Arabī. Through a close analysis of texts, the book clearly traces the crystallization of an influential school of thought in Islamic history and its place in the broader intellectual culture. Offering an exploration of the development of Sufi expression and thought, this book will be a valuable resource for students and scholars of Islamic thought, philosophy, and mysticism. (shrink)

This article discusses the application of the Avicennan theory of demonstrative science on taṣawwuf, or the Divine Science (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī), by members of the Akbarian tradition, particularly Ibn ʿArabī’s (d. 1240) stepson and most influential disciple, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 1274), and his commentators, among whom the most prominent was Mullā Muḥammad b. Ḥamza al-Fanārī (d. 1431). It aims to find out what kind of relationship was developed between Avicennan logic and Sufism by the two members of the Akbarian school (...) in the post-classical Islamic thought. It also seeks to show that the convergence between different currents of Islamic thought—Sufism and philosophy in this case—led to some adaptation problems and internal inconsistencies for these currents. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTwo rival scholars from Shiraz in Persia, Dawānī and Dashtakī engaged in a bitter and extended dispute over a range of metaphysical and logical issues. One of these was the liar paradox. Their debate on this point marked the most extensive scrutiny of the paradox in Arabic until that time. Dashtakī’s solution was to deny that the statement ‘What I say is false’ is true or false, on the ground that there is one statement and one application of the falsity (...) predicate. Given that – ex hypothesi – there is no other statement, there is no basis for a reiteration of the truth or falsity predicate and describing the statement itself as true or false. Dawānī’s solution was to deny that ‘What I say is false’ is a statement at all, and he argued that it is instead akin to a performative utterance such as ‘I hereby sell you this’. (shrink)

This article presents a discussion of key aspects of knowledge in Sufism through an analysis of the film Bab’Aziz: The Prince Who Contemplated His Soul. The dominant Western pe...

The Shams al-dīn al-Samarqandī who is the first scholar to adopt the method of the philosophical theology in the Hanafī-Māturīdī tradition, is an important Turkish-Islamic thinker who has proven himself in rational and transmitted sciences by giving works in various fields such as theology, logic, mathematics, astronomy, tafsir, ādāb al-bahth wa al-munāzara. Placing the science of logic at the center of his system, al-Samarqandī analyzed every opinion and evidence put forward logically and aimed to reach the truth. Divine attributes, the (...) temporality of the universe, and the God-universe relationship are at the forefront of the subjects that he aims to reach certain and real knowledge. In this respect, al-Samarqandī analyzed the ontological character of divine and universal attributes. The concept of the hypothetical existential essence plays a key role for the author, who begins by analyzing the types of quiddity. defining the concept of existential as As “that which is without any negativity in its essence and truth", al-Samarqandī, who stipulates to exist as a block and not to have any negativity in its existence, brings a unique expansion to this concept. al-Samarqandī, who defines determination as "an adjective that distinguishes the existent from all mental and external beings", claims that this concept has an existential essence. As a result of his concerns about necesarry existence, Samarqandi, who does not deny the philosophers who accept the necessary existence and determination as identical, also overcomes the problems of multiplicity and causality that may arise about God, with the concept of "hypothetical", if he considers determination as "existential". As a matter of fact, al-Samarqandī divides existence into two parts as real and hypothetical, and defines the real existence as "existing in the real sense and not based on any rational assumption"; defines hypothetical existence as "based on rational assumption". In this case, it is not possible to talk about a real multiplicity or causality. al-Samarqandī claims that the concept of necessity falls within the scope of the hypothetical existential essence. Because wujûb means “the essence necessarily necessitates existence”. It is deduced that wujûb must also be existential, since something necessitating existence must take the judgment of existence. By characterizing the concept of wujûb with hypothetical essence, in the sense of a mental formation that is immune to objective existence, he also avoids the doubt of plurality. Concerned that the regard of possibility as an existential essence may require God to be necessary per se and the universe to be eternal, theologians accepted possibility as an absent essence. al-Samarqandī states that possibility can be accepted within the scope of true non-existent or hypothetical existential essence. As a matter of fact, evaluating the possibility in this way also eliminates the possibility that God is necessary and the universe is ancient. Attributes that can be attributed to God and can create a multiplicity in His essence or that can be attributed to the universe and cause the universe to be eternal are evaluated within the scope of the concept of the hypothetical existential essence, and, the idea that God is unique and that he is the only eternal entity is based on this concept. (shrink)

The Kitāb Takrīm al-ma‛īsha bi-taḥrīm al-ḥashīsha and the Kitāb Tatmīm al-Takrīm li-mā fi l-ḥashīsh min al-taḥrīm by Quṭb al-dīn al-Qasṭallānī occupy a prominent place in the Arabic literature scene on drugs in general and on hashish in particular. Its relevance is due to the fact that most of the Arab authors of subsequent centuries made use of these two epistles in drafting their treatises. That is why al-Qasṭallānī is the most frequently quoted authority in the aforementioned treatises. A close look (...) at both epistles reveals a considerable amount of historiographic unknown data to date on Arabic writing devoted to hashish and prompts us to question other generally accepted data. Futhermore, the characterisation of al-Qasṭallānī's historic personality perfectly illustrates the arrangement of orthodox sufi stratum who were the most important defenders of the ideological fight against hashish consumption during the 13th century. At the same time, the study of the contents of their epistles offers us a clear image of the general ideological context in which the controversy among those Sufis who were against and those who were for the ritual consumption for hashish took place. (shrink)

Talvez o paralelo mais próximo do Logos joanino no Islã seja encontrado na noção da "Realidade Muhammadana" (al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadiyya). O termo foi provavelmente usado pela primeira vez por Ibn ʿArabī (d. 1240), mas a explicação detalhada mais antiga do que ela representa foi fornecida por Saʿīd ibn Aḥmad Farghānī (d. 1300), um excelente aluno do principal propagador de Ibn ʿArabī, Ṣadr al-Dīn Qûnawī. Farghānī escreveu um comentário denso, em dois volumes, sobre a famosa qasida de 760 versos de Ibn al-Fāriḍ, (...) Naẓm al-sulûk. Profundamente enraizado na metafísica islâmica, na teologia e na psicologia espiritual, o comentário explica como o poeta está descrevendo o arquétipo eterno de Muhammad em Deus como o meio pelo qual Deus cria o universo e o lugar de retorno final de todas as coisas. (shrink)

Islamic thought, no matter what tradition it belonged to, went through a process in which almost all thinkers after the twelfth century were also commentators of Avicenna (d. 428/1037). When this phenomenon combined with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's (d. 606/1210) ability to problematize, his critical readings revealed the aporias and turned them into problems which would occupy the thinker’s mind after him and waiting to be solved. The quiddityof knowledge has an important place among these, both in terms of being closely (...) related to many issues where ontology, epistemology and axiology intersect and being a problem area where the Islamic intellectual traditions’ conception of existence is directly reflected. As seen in the analyses of many thinkers, notably Râzî, the ontology, quiddity and category of knowledge in Avicennian philosophy contain elements that are conducive to encountering important challenges when the system as a whole is taken into consideration. Accordingly, scholars like Shams al-Dīn al-Isfahānî (ö. 749/1349), al-Taftāzānī (ö. 792/1390), al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (ö. 816/1413), Alî al-Qūshjī (ö. 879/1474), al-Dawwānī (ö. 908/1502), Sadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (ö. 903/1498) have taken the discussion to a further point both in terms of identifying the problem and revealing its implications and proposing solutions. This study aims to analyze the sixteenth-century thinker Kutb al-Dīn al-Ījī’s treatment of this problem who inherited the debates of past on the matter in question. He carries out his evaluations especially through the Alī al-Qūshjī (ö. 879/1474), al-Dawwānī (ö. 908/1502) and al-Dashtakī’s comments on the subject. He makes important contributions by analyzing these scholars’ solution offers con-cerning the problem of categorical status of knowledge and putting forward his own approach. He thinks that Alī al-Qūshjī’s distinction between realization (husūl) and subsistence (qiyām), al-Dashtakī’s theory of transformation and al-Dawwānī’s offer to not put the knowledge under the category of quality are problematic from various aspects. (shrink)

The text of “The Four Premises” (Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a), which began with Sadr al-Sharī‘ah (d. 747/1346), centralizes on the actions of human beings by connecting it with the problem of good and evil in the field of kalām, Islamic philosophy and logic, and fıqh. It was also commented in with incisive and critical footness by Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 791/1390). In Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a, al-Kastalī (d. 901/1496) discusses the two main issues. One of them is good/husn-evil/qubh, the other is human (...) actions. Good-evil dichotomy here is axiological, whereas the human actions are examined within an ontological structure. The quest for the origin of moral values is a husn-qubh debate. Identifying the hierarchy of human actions in ontology is another problem. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the theological discussions in the Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a which were written following the order of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror/Fatih. This text addresses the origin of moral judgment and the question of freedom and destiny in human actions linked to the problem of good and evil. Discussing these two fundamental issues, has made it necessary to thoroughly investigate perhaps all the subheadings which concern the entire paradigm that falls under the framework of understanding the God, nature, and humanity. By looking at the treatise, the main sources of the issues being discussed are mostly generated from an Islamic jurisprudence works, entitled Tawḍīḥ and Talwīḥ. It can easily be discerned that the direct quotations that were made or taken indirectly were from these two sources. References to other sources were quite seldom. However, the excerpts that were taken from primary sources were interpreted and expounded by the author and amended anew. In this article al-Kastalī’s comments will be analyzed. He’s work Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a will be analyzed in depth and will be published for the first time with a critical edition. Text of Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a is a product of a culture of criticism and critical thinking has two foundations: Disproval and verification. Critical thinking is then bidirectional. It is wrong to carry out the criticism activity in only one direction. It is insufficient to simply refute the opposing idea. It is not enough to show the wrong. The so-called right idea also needs to be justified. In the Tawdīh, Sadr al-Sharī‘ah criticizes al-Ashʿarī in the issues of husn-qubh and human actions. According to this criticism, good and evil should be based on the reason. On the other hand, human is free in his actions. As it is known, goodness and badness was based on religion according to al-Ashʿarī. Acquisition (kasb) given to man was unclear. It is al-Taftāzānī who wrote an annotation on Tawḍīḥ with the name of Talwīḥ. He’s comments are successful in terms of theology. However, these interpretations do not mean that he accepted the Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a. In terms of al-Taftāzānī, proofs of Sadr al-Sharī‘ah is weak. The theological disputes in Tawḍīḥ and Talwīḥ have reached the level of tension in the following works. The origins of the divergence are based on the differentiation between the schools of al-Māturīdi and al-Ashʿarī. In fact, these schools are not different from each other in terms of the method they use. Although the roads walked were the same, the results achieved were different. The main reason for this is that the issue is ambiguous and the problem of good and evil is multidimensional. It is directly related to God and human. It is also connected with ontology and epistemology together. The position on the husn-qubh issue is also decisive for other theological problems. The root of the evil problem or theodicy is mostly based on this problem in Islamic thought. The actions of God and human are questioned here. The value judgments that actions will take are examined. Which action is more moral and better? Another major problem discussed in this article is human actions. It is a matter of freedom of human volition. The volition of man before the absolute God is a problem. Because God has absolute power, will and knowledge. On the other hand, God imposes responsibility on man. But what are the limits of this responsibility? Al-Kastalī discusses all these problems in the context of Sadr al-Sharī‘ah and al-Taftāzānī. In the big picture there are representatives of the schools of al-Māturīdi and al-Ashʿarī. Al-Kastalī doesn’t paint a new picture, rather makes the lines in the picture clear. In this article, the texts will be analyzed mutually. The content and uses of the concepts will be given importance. Ideas will be discussed from their main sources and the roots and different reach of the issues will be touched. The interactions of different schools of thought will also be included. (shrink)

Sayyid Sadr al-din Mohammad Dashtaki Shirazi is the inventor of the division of composition into unified composition and composition by join. With this division, Dashtaki has expressed a new theory about the composition of the material object from first matter and form, as well as the composition of man from soul and body, and considers these compositions as an alliance and unification, not simply the parts joining to each other. In this paper, we will present Dashtaki’s arguments on the theory (...) of unified composition. We will also examine three objections to this theory and responses to them. Finally, we will examine the background of this theory in Bahmanyar's phrases. Dashtaki believes that when the components in the compound have a real plurality, i.e. each one exists separately from the other, a composition by join is created, such as the composition of a house from numerous clays. But if the components in the compound are united and none of them are separate from the others and exists actually, the resulting composition will be an alliance and union. He believes that in the unified composition, every component is identical to any other component and is identical to the whole. Accordingly, Reza is a unique being, both human and writer. In order to achieve a composition, a plurality is needed and in order to form a single composition, there must be plural components related to each other. An important question is that, principally how is a composition possible, if unified composition comes to existence only when the components are made united with each other and with the whole? In other words, unified composition is not possible, because the first condition of the acquisition of the composition, i.e., the plurality of the constituent components, is not satisfied. Dashtaki strives to express a difference between the components in the union compound. He believes that the conditions of the realization and the survival of the components are different, and that is enough for them to be different. In Dashtaki's point of view, in the unified composition the components are analytical, not being separate and plural, in reality. In other words, the components do not have actual and "in-the-world" plurality, which means that it is our intellect that separates them and looks at them as independent objects. Therefore, unity and identity are in-the-world and plurality and discernibility are analytical and in the mind. Dashtaki's first argument for his theory in general is as follows: the three major material objects (solid, plant and animal) are undoubtedly real compounds. But in these compositions, components exist potentially, and in a unified composition, components do not exist actually. Therefore, these objects are unified compounds. The second argument is that the accuracy of predication implies unity. In the unified composition, the components are identical with the whole, and therefore, the components can be predicated to the composition. In Dashtaki's view, if A is predicated to B, then it could be concluded that they are identical and unified. The first objection to this theory is that the unity is incompatible with causality. From the perspective of the Peripatetics, form is the cause of the matter, and this is incompatible with the union of the two. Dashtaki states that in case of causality, there is no need for cause and effect to be two different and discernible entities, but a single entity may be from one aspect the cause and, from another, the effect. In other words, the foresaid causality is analytical causality. When mind analyses something, and then finds analytical components, it can see between those analytical and intellectual components, causality, and find some of them as the cause of the others. The second objection is the incorrectness of the unity in compounds with components not being similar. only in the compounds having similar parts, one can accept the unity of matter and form. For example, in compounds such as horses, it is not possible to accept the union of matter and form, because in horses, there are components with different natures, such as bones, flesh and nerves. Unity of These parts with each other and with the whole is not plausible. Dashtaki’s respond is that the horse is also a natural unit and has no actual plurality. Components having similar or different natures does not make any difference. According to the theory of unified composition, the horse's components are united with the horse's form and have only analytical plurality. Horse’s components are just analytical components, not actual, independent ones. The third objection is the incompatibility of the actual existence of components with their unity. But Dashtaki maintains that a unique actual personal entity cannot have actual plural components. He states that compounds such as horses exist objectively, but objective and real existing is divided into two kinds: dependent existence, and independent existence as a single real thing. Therefore, the two characteristics of "being a component" and "being independent" are incompatible and do not come together in a real being. Dashtaki has also quoted phrases from Bahmanyar to confirm his point of view. Bahmanyar says that the properties of an animal belong to the whole and compound, not to each component. For example, it is a horse that feels, not its bone or brain, as the eye is also a compound, but seeing is the work of the eye, not the work of any of its components. Therefore, the animal, which is something compound, has characteristics that none of its components have. So the animal is something over and above its components. Bahmanyar thinks the components in the animal are potential. Then he states a general rule: any compound in which unity is real, its components do potentially exist. Therefore, Bahmanyar considers the body parts of the living organism as a potential being and generally believes that the components of any compound that have true unity are potential. The potentiality of the components in a real compound does not that mean that the components are destroyed and a new thing is produced. The components are also available, but they do not have the effects they had separately before the composition comes into existence. In other words, the components have found a unique identity together and therefore have a new effect.. It seems that Bahmanyar has expressed the same idea that Dashtaki is looking for in the theory of unified composition. Therefore, it can be said that before Dashtaki, Bahmanyar has come up with the thought of a unity. Of course, Bahmanyar has not explained much about this, and Dashtaki is the first who has organized and completed this idea as a philosophical theory. (shrink)

In book twenty of the forty books which compose the Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihya' 'ulum al-din), Abu hamid al-Ghazali gives a full account of the customs and character of the Messenger of God, Muhammad. It is not a biography of Muhammad (peace and blessing of God be upon him) but a roadmap for those who want to strengthen their faith, increase their knowledge, and deepen their understanding of the second part of the testimony of faith, namely the first (...) pillar of Islam. The author details the Messenger's noble nature and his miracles, while removing doubts regarding his message. He deals with the issue of the imitation of Muhammad (peace and blessing of God be upon him) noting that the ultimate source of knowledge is revelation from God which comes to us through the Messenger. This volume lays clear that the aim of the imam in this Series is to call for a return to the Sunna and the imitation of the Messenger in all aspects of life. (shrink)

Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirazi (1572-1640), more commonly called Mulla Sadra, was one of the grand scholars of later-period Islamic philosophy and has grown to become one of the best-known Muslim philosophers. Iksir al-'arifin, or Elixir of the Gnostics, is unique among Sadra's writings in that it reworks and amplifies an earlier Persian work, the Jawidan-nama ( Book of the Everlasting ) by Afdal al-Din Kashani, or Baba Afdal. The underlying theme of Sadra's amplification is emblematic of Muslim philosophy: the importance (...) of self-knowledge in an individual's journey of "Origin and Return," the soul's origins with God and its eventual return to Him. Everything, Sadra says, is on such a path, gradually disengaging from the material world and returning to a transcendent essence--all leading to a final fruition in which everything in the universe returns to God and finds permanent happiness. Philosophy, Sadra argues, is the most direct means to self-knowledge--and thus the best tool for navigating this journey. (shrink)

This text is a bilingual Arabic-English translation of one of the most important metaphysical works of the Persian Muslim philosopher known as Mulla Sadra & Sadr al-Din Muhammad al-Shirazi. In this work Mulla Sadra develops an anti-Platonic philosophical position which is non-Aristotelian. He holds that "existents" are ontologically prior to "essence" & that there are two different realms -- the mind dependent domain & entities which exist independent of the mind. Mulla Sadra's views became very popular among Iranian Muslim philosophers (...) & eventually were instrumental in destroying the Aristotelian school of thought in the Islamic world. The translator, Dr. Parviz Morewedge, is the Secretary-Treasurer of the Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy & Science & has published ten books & numerous articles in Islamic Philosophy & Mysticism. (shrink)

Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm; -1641; Islamic philosophy.

The paper explores the role and meaning of maṣlaḥa and its possible appropriation in the field of Islamic legal and economic thought, as laid down by various medieval and contemporary Muslim scholars. Questions that are pertinent to the research are the following: how has maṣlaḥa been incorporated in legal reasoning and what kind of meaning does it convey; what type of economic reading does it presuppose; do ethics, law, and scriptural sources play equally important role as reference in developing the (...) concept in economic terms, are some of the questions that this paper will try to provide answer to. Further, as there is a tendency to believe that Islamic economic thought cannot be equated only with legal and juridical underpinnings, it is pertinent to pose a question if economic ideas have flourished independently from its legal framework. Maṣlaḥa in its capacity has always remained part and parcel of Islamic legal theory, and has been rarely addressed within the frame of economic thought; therefore a new reading is required to deal with the position of economic teachings within Islamic tradition. The paper consists of three sections, whereby the contributions made by Muslim medieval scholars on Islamic economics will be presented. The first chapter provides a historical overview of Islamic law and the concept of maṣlaḥa in relation to the field of Islamic economics, including Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s monumental Iḥya ‘ulūm al dīn, which presents a milestone in converging Sufi ethical teachings of Islam in accordance with the legal methodology of Islamic law. The second part aims to discern and examine the economic jurisprudence and economic theory in Islam as it is understood by some of the mainstream theoreticians of Islamic studies, advocating the view that Islamic economics is inextricably related to the gist of Islamic legal reasoning. In this section the ideas of Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr will be presented as he proposes a new reading of Islamic economics as a doctrine and not a science. The third part questions Islamic legal establishment and its normativity, the claim that legal norms have always been part of the Islamic economic reasoning. This claim rests upon the idea that Islamic legal patterns were also socially constructed, including some aspects of Islamic economic reasoning. Concluding remarks will draw upon the idea that despite the fact that Islamic legal and economic literature are based upon the religious scriptures of Islam, the Qur’an and Tradition, it is more appropriate to claim that they rest upon the ethical cosmology that surpasses purely theological concerns. (shrink)

Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm, d. 1641- Criticism and interpretation ; Ḥikmat-i Mutiʻālīyah ; Islamic philosophy.

The "Text" and the "Commentary" mentioned in the title of this essay are, respectively, the "Kitāb al-Manāẓir", or "Optics", of al-Ḥasan ibn al-Haytham, composed in the first half of the fifth/eleventh century, and the "Tanqīḥ al-Manāẓir li-dhawī l-abṣār wa l-baṣā'ir", written by Abū l-Ḥasan (or al-Ḥasan) Kamāl al-Dīn al-Fārisī in the second half of the seventh/thirteenth century. It is known that, so far, only the first five of the seven "maqālāt"/Books that make up the Arabic text of IH's "Optics" have (...) been published, and that the "Tanqīḥ" was published in two volumes. I shall be concerned with certain episodes in the lives of these two works, my aim being to shed light on their transmission within the Islamic Arabic and Persian worlds. -/- . (shrink)

Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirazi, more commonly called Mulla Sadra, was one of the grand scholars of later-period Islamic philosophy and has grown to become one of the best-known Muslim philosophers. _Iksir al-'arifin_, or _Elixir of the Gnostics_, is unique among Sadra's writings in that it reworks and amplifies an earlier Persian work, the _Jawidan-nama_ by Afdal al-Din Kashani, or Baba Afdal. The underlying theme of Sadra's amplification is emblematic of Muslim philosophy: the importance of self-knowledge in an individual's journey of (...) "Origin and Return," the soul's origins with God and its eventual return to Him. Everything, Sadra says, is on such a path, gradually disengaging from the material world and returning to a transcendent essence—all leading to a final fruition in which everything in the universe returns to God and finds permanent happiness. Philosophy, Sadra argues, is the most direct means to self-knowledge—and thus the best tool for navigating this journey. (shrink)

Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm, -1641 -- Views on ethics. ; Islamic ethics. ; Islamic philosophy.

Abū Ishāq al-Ṣaffār was one of scholars of the Western Qarakhānids’ period who followed the Kalām thought of al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). His theological works Talkhīs al-adilla and Risāla fī al-kalām, his method in kalām, and frequent reference to his works by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that al-Ṣaffār is a respected and authorative Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the kalām. By adding a long introduction to Talkhīs about the naming, importance, and religious legitimacy of the science (...) of kalām, Saffār asserted that the kalām should be learned. When systematical vindication of the science of kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the kalām among Ḥanafī-Māturīdīs. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation. Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania. In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists. His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- SUMMARY: Abū Ishāq Ibrahīm b. Ismāil Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī is a scholar belonging to the Ḥanafī theological tradition which was improved by the contribution of Ḥanafī theologians who used thinking system of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) as base and adopted Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and his thoughts in historical process. The contents of his theological works Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risāla fī al-Kalām, the method that he used, and references to his works made by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that he is an important Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the science of Kalām. -/- In Talkhīs al-adilla, there are two sections including the subject of naming, and importance and necessity of Kalām discipline. Here, the necessity of learning Kalām and its value are defended in detail. -/- Besides, rumors “Abū Ḥanīfa turned away from the science of Kalām in his doomsdays” and that “He prohibited to make occupation with Kalām completely” are evaluated. -/- When systematical vindication of the science of Kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the Kalām among Ḥanafī Māturīdīs. Even if Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Abū al-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100) and Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) defend that the science of Kalām is not wrong for religion; yet, the vindication of Kalām does not take a place under a separate title and in a detailed manner in any of Māturīdī theologians works. -/- The method that al-Ṣaffār used when he is defending the science of Kalām, differs from strategy of Abū Ḥanīfa. While Abū Ḥanīfa has mentioned that there is a need for the science of Kalām under these new circumstances, al-Ṣaffār has defended theologians who were charged with being Ahl al-Bidaʿ, by trying to prove that the prophets especially the Prophet Ibrāhīm, even the Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad (Ṣaḥāba) and the Successors of the Companions (Tābiʿūn) scholars use their minds and make arguments in religious matters. In this respect, he emphasizes that the Qurʾān orders to think and discuss gently, not to be stay in silence: “And dispute with them, using what is best” (16.125-126). Therefore, he states that this discipline which took a mission to explain and defend the creed of Islam (ʿaqīda), cannot be characterized as an innovation (bidʿah) or illicit. -/- His vindication method can be defined as a more developed type of method that Abu’l-Ḥasan al-Ash’arī’s (d. 324/935) used in Risāla fī istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of Kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation: -/- a) Explanation: Explaining the necessity and importance of the science of Kalām by giving information about its definition, names, value and place among other principles. -/- b) Demonstration: Revealing the religious basics of the science of Kalām from the Qurʾān, the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Companions of the Prophet, and the Successors of the Companions thus specifying that it is legitimate for religion. -/- c) Refutation: Replying the claims having aim to weaken the value of Kalām principle and its religious legality. -/- Al-Ṣaffār describes ‘the science of Kalām’ as ‘Knowing the Real with the evidences which help to reach the absolute information’. By allocating the concept of 'Ḥaqq', he repeats the definition of Kalām as “it is to know God with certain evidences” in a part of his work, and “it is to know the principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) with certain evidences” in another part. He describes Kalām as “Knowing ḥaqq / God / uṣūl al-dīn by depending on evidence”, and tries to prove that it is wrong to consider a science which performs the stated duty, as illicit and abominable and thus turn away from it. -/- Al-Ṣaffār thinks that it is right to call this principle as ‘Kalām’ because of the certain evidences leading to the truth that this science has used. This thought was defended by other theologians as well. -/- For example, according to Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1310) it seems like to say “This is the word (kalām), not the other knowings” by the way of the power of evidences used in Kalām.Thus, it is appropriate to give name Kalām for this science which based on certain evidences. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s explanations revealed in scope of vindication of the Kalām are adopted by some of following scholars. Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Sighnāqī (d. 714/1314) in his book called al-Tasdīd sharḥ al-Tamhīd fī qawāʿid al-tawḥīd quotes Saffâr’s explanations as the same. -/- Al-Ṣaffār indicates that the method told in the Qurʾān is to reply questions about religion, beliefs and rejection instead of remaining in silence. The duty taken on by Kalām is this vindication activity performed by the prophets whose examples are described in the Qurʾān and which is legal and demanded. His way of thinking and vindication of the Kalām resembles that of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. Al-Māturīdī says, “Prophets and we were ordered to invite infidels to Islam. When this invitation happens, the respondents will ask for evidence and explanation, and discussion will be inevitable. Therefore, discussing and talking about subjects of Kalām is not objectionable”. -/- Thoughts of al-Māturīdī and al-Ṣaffār regarding the vindication of the Kalām were repeated by Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) later. According to al-Ṣābūnī, the evidences put against deniers and especially the discussion made by the Prophet Ibrāhīm to defend his own belief, prove the legality of Kalām discipline. Likewise, according to al-Rāzī, the duty of Kalām is just an activity performed already in the Qurʾān and ordered to the prophets. At this point of view, since the prophets were leading to Kalām, banning this activity is nonsense. -/- According to al-Ṣaffār, the reason for why Abu Hanifa avoids his son Hammād from these discussions is that Abu Hanifa does not like discussions based on obstinate. Otherwise, it cannot be that Abū Ḥanīfa prohibits to learn Kalām and make discussion about Kalām. According to him, this behavior of Abū Ḥanīfa results from that people discussing with him are ignorant about the subject of Kalām, discussion turns to an obstinate, and coming to an end of discussion seems impossible. This comment of al-Ṣaffār is quoted in Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda by ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmed b. Muṣṭafā Tashköprüzāde (d. 968/1561) and in Minaḥ al-rawḍ al-azhar fī sharḥ al-Fiqh al-akbar by ʿAlī b. Sulṭān Muḥammad al-Qārī (d. 1014/1606) as same as his words. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of Kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against Kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania.In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of Kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists (fuqahāʾ). Because some of the Ḥanafī jurists thought that Abū Ḥanīfa forsook occupation with the science of Kalām and even he prohibited his son to have interest in this discipline. But some of Ḥanafī theologians such as al-Māturīdī, al-Nasafī and al-Ṣaffār protested this thought which describes Abū Ḥanīfa as a banner for Kalām. -/- His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- His book Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd is a unique source in terms of containing vindication of the Kalām in detail and also influencing the approaches of the next period scholars. (shrink)

Over the last few decades the study of Shīʿī Islam has witnessed a growing interest in specific aspects and perspectives of Shīʿī philosophers and theologians. The monograph authored by Sayeh Meisami focuses on the views of two of the most influential thinkers in Shīʿī, namely the eleventh century Ismāʿīlī thinker Ḥāmid al-Kirmānī and the Twelver mystic and thinker Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, better known as Mullā Ṣadrā. Throughout the five chapters, the textual comparative analysis of their thought shows how multifaceted epistemological (...) and cosmological keys are transmitted from al-Kirmānī to Mullā Ṣadra, and ultimately become interwoven with their respective theories about the legitimacy of the Imām. Epistemology, cosmology, and political theory thus become, in the author’s analysis, the fil rouge that characterize the development of Shīʿī mystical and political philosophies up to the advent of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic of Iran. (shrink)

Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm al-Zāhid al-Ṣaffār is one of the important representatives of the Kalām thought of the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī School. He was born in A.H. 450/ C.E. 1058 in Bukhara that is one of the city of Transoxiana/Mawara al-nahr where Maturidi School has emerged around this socio-cultural environment. He completed his education and served as a leader (rais/ ṣadr) of the Hanafite scholars there until he was exiled to the city of Marv. Upon his return from exile, he passed away in (...) Bukhara in A.H. 534/ C.E. 1139. The present study aims to determine his method in Kalām. The introduction outlines the subject, significance, purpose, method, and sources of the research. In this study, it was employed a method that focuses on a person in which he/she is examined with his/her views and thoughts by taking into account his/her socio-cultural factors. By doing this, the first chapter of this study deals with the political, socio-economic, and scientific situation in Transoxiana, and the activities of diverse religions, sects, and philosophical schools in this region in A.H. V-VI/C.E. XI-XII. In the second chapter, it studies al-Ṣaffār’s life, scientific personality, works as well as the sources that he made references to in his works in detail. In the third chapter, the kalām method of al-Ṣaffār has been tried to be determined. For this purpose, it analyzes his extant works, Talkhīṣ al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risālah fī al-kalām and elaborates first on his defense of the Kalām that gives great importance to reason (ʿaql) and to intellectual debates, if necessary, in theological issues. Then it explores his theory of knowledge with his ideas on the definition, possibility, sources, and types of knowledge, and the epistemological understandings he defensed or criticised. Furthermore, to determine his Kalām method, it evaluates his approach towards the value of ‘aql and naql (Qurʾān-Ḥadīth) as sources of knowledge. Since this issue is a distinctive tool for unveiling the kalām methods of different mutakallims and Muslim sects. Finally, it finds out the types of istidlāl, meaning inference of one thing from the other that he used when he argues and defends his views, and illustrates with examples. (shrink)